Policymakers, legislators, scientists, thinkers, military strategists, academics, and all those interested in understanding the future want to know how twenty-first century scientific advance should be regulated in war and peace. This book tries to provide some of the answers. Part I summarises some important elements of the relevant law. In Part II, individual chapters are devoted to cyber capabilities, highly automated and autonomous systems, human enhancement technologies, human degradation techniques, the regulation of nanomaterials, novel naval technologies, outer space, synthetic brain (...) technologies beyond artificial intelligence, and biometrics. The final part of the book notes important synergies that emerge between the different technologies and legal provisions, existing and proposed, assesses notions of convergence and of composition in international law, and provides some concluding remarks. The new technologies, their uses, and their regulation in war and peace are presented to the reader who is invited to draw conclusions. (shrink)

Alienation and Connection addresses social constructs that perpetuate alienation through suffering. The contributors discuss how alienation through suffering in a variety of contexts can be transformed into connection and reconnection: human relationship with the environment, economic and social systems that disconnect and reconnect, cultural constructs that divide or can heal, encountered difference that brings opportunity, and various manifestations of personal pain that can be survived and even overcome.

v. 1. Essays on ethics by the Earl of Shaftesbury, Frances Hutcheson ; Samuel Butler ; Adam Smith ; Jeremy Bentham - v. 2. Essays by Samuel Clarke ; John Balguy ; Richard Price ; John Brown ; John Clarke ; Ralph Cudworth ; John Gay ; Thomas Hobbes ; Henry Home Kames ; John Locke ; John Mandeville ; William Paley ; William Wollaston.

William P. Alston. difference in the scope of the rule reflects the fact that I-rules exist for the sake of making communication possible. Whereas their cousins are enacted and enforced for other reasons. We could distinguish I-rules just by this ...

“William James is a towering figure in the history of American thought--without doubt the foremost psychologist this country has produced. His depiction of mental life is faithful, vital, and subtle. In verve, he has no equal.... “There is a sharp contrast between the expanding horizon of James and the constricting horizon of much contemporary psychology. The one opens doors to discovery, the other closes them. Much psychology today is written in terms of reaction, little in terms of becoming. James (...) would say that a balance is needed, but that only by assuming that man has the capacity for growth are we likely to discover the scope of this same capacity.” —from the introduction by Gordon W. Allport. (shrink)

Reprint of the original, first published in 1860.

The mechanistic perspective has dominated biological disciplines such as biochemistry, physiology, cell and molecular biology, and neuroscience, especially during the 20th century. The primary strategy is reductionist: organisms are to be decomposed into component parts and operations at multiple levels. Researchers adopting this perspective have generated an enormous body of information about the mechanisms of life at scales ranging from the whole organism down to genetic and other molecular operations.

William Vitek enlarges our understanding by treating the act of promising as a social practice and complex human experience. Citing engaging examples of promises made in everyday life, in extraordinary circumstances, and in literary works, Vitek grapples with the central paradox of promising: that human beings can intend a future to which they are largely blind. _Promising_ evaluates contemporary approaches to the topic by such philosophers as John Rawls, John Searle, Henry Sidgwick, P.S. Atiyah, and Michael Robbins but transcend (...) their more limited focus on promissory obligation. Vitek's innovative approach moves beyond theories of language, ethics, and law to unveil a complex human activity subject to shifting interpretations and changes in nature. (shrink)

Research on diseases such as cancer reveals that primary mechanisms, which have been the focus of study by the new mechanists in philosophy of science, are often subject to control by other mechanisms. Cancer cells employ the same primary mechanisms as healthy cells but control them differently. I use cancer research to highlight just how widespread control is in individual cells. To provide a framework for understanding control, I reconceptualize mechanisms as imposing constraints on flows of free energy, with control (...) mechanisms operating on flexible constraints in primary mechanisms. I argue that control mechanisms themselves often form complex, integrated networks. (shrink)

One way in which philosophy of science can perform a valuable normative function for science is by showing characteristic errors made in scientific research programs and proposing ways in which such errors can be avoided or corrected. This paper examines two errors that have commonly plagued research in biology and psychology: 1) functional localization errors that arise when parts of a complex system are assigned functions which these parts are not themselves able to perform, and 2) vacuous functional explanations in (...) which one provides an analysis that does account for the inputs and outputs of a system but does not employ the same set of functions to produce this output as does the natural system. These two kinds of error usually arise when researchers limit their investigation to one type of evidence. Historically, correction of these errors has awaited researchers who have employed the opposite type of evidence. This paper explores the tendency to commit these errors by examining examples from historical and contemporary science and proposes a dialectical process through which researchers can avoid or correct such errors in the future. (shrink)

Two strategies for using a model as “null” are distinguished. Null modeling evaluates whether a process is causally responsible for a pattern by testing it against a null model. Baseline modeling measures the relative significance of various processes responsible for a pattern by detecting deviations from a baseline model. When these strategies are conflated, models are illegitimately privileged as accepted until rejected. I illustrate this using the neutral theory of ecology and draw general lessons from this case. First, scientists cannot (...) draw certain conclusions using null modeling. Second, these conclusions follow using baseline modeling, but doing so requires more evidence. (shrink)

This paper argues that human beings possess the rational capabilities necessary to achieve the goal of more just and peaceable social orders, but that our educational institutions are failing in their responsibility to do what in fact can be done to produce graduates who make decisions in ways most likely to achieve this goal.Data compiled by us, consistent with other research, indicates that only a small percentage of the individuals graduating from universities and professional schools have developed the capacity for (...) post-conventional moral reasoning. (shrink)

Eleonore Stump and Katherin Rogers have recently defended the doctrine of divine timelessness in separate essays, arguing that the doctrine is consistent with libertarian free will and that timeless divine knowledge is providentially useful. I show that their defenses do not succeed; a doctrine of eternity having these features cannot be saved.

William Hare; Open-mindedness in the Classroom, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 251–259, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14.

Explanations of biological phenomena such as cell division, protein synthesis or circadian rhythms commonly take the form of models of the responsible mechanisms. Recently philosophers of science have attempted to analyze this practice, presenting mechanisms as organized collections of parts performing operations that together produce the phenomenon. But in some cases what researchers seek to explain is not a general phenomenon, but a specific feature of a more fine-grained phenomenon. In some of these cases, it is not the model of (...) the mechanism that performs the explanatory work. I consider a case in which the investigator offered an abstract representation of a fine-grained phenomenon to show why in had the feature in question. I consider a second case in which a researcher abstracted from the mechanism to identify a design principle that explains why the functioning mechanism exhibits a specific feature. (shrink)

The present dilemma in philosophy -- What pragmatism means -- Some metaphysical problems pragmatically considered -- The one and the many -- Pragmatism and common sense -- Pragmatism's conception of truth -- Pragmatism and humanism -- Pragmatism and religion.

In the nearly half a century since its modern inception (Anscombe (1965), Hintikka (1969)), the Representation theory has faced no more implacable enemy than Ned Block. He has offered objection after objection, usually in the form of apparent counterexamples, and as I write this he shows no sign of flagging.

In a recent discussion article in this journal, Gila Sher responds to some of my criticisms of her work on what she calls the formal-structural account of logical consequence. In the present paper I reply and attempt to advance the discussion in a constructive way. Unfortunately, Sher seems to have not fully understood my 1997. Several of the defenses she mounts in her 2001 are aimed at views I do not hold and did not advance in my 1997. Most prominent (...) among these are her claims that I reject the formal-structural account, because it licenses “unnatural” logical constants, and that I consider the “truth-functional criterion” for connectives “a paradigm of a successful criterion of logicality”. Both of these claims are simply false, as even a moderately careful reading of my 1997 will show. Other charges she makes have some basis in fact but are inaccurate. For example, she says that I claim that FS is “neutral with regard to the apriority of logic,” and that this neutrality “renders it inconsistent”. What I actually say is that Sher’s acceptance of the neutrality in question is “inconsistent with part of the legacy of Tarski, a legacy that she finds very congenial”, not that FS itself is inconsistent. More interestingly, she misunderstands my claim about the apriority of logic, and clarification of this misunderstanding suggests two distinct ways in which logic might be held to be free of empirical influence. It is also noteworthy that Sher’s statements about the apriority of logic constitute both a change in the position she took in her 1991 and, although she seems not to realize it, an admission that she does not take issue with one of my major criticisms. (shrink)

In Barnett and Block :711–716, 2009a), the present authors claim that borrowing short and lending long is fraudulent, and thus ought to be prohibited on legal grounds. Bagus and Howden :399, 2009) take issue with our ethical analysis. The present paper is our response to these authors; it is an attempt to defend Barnett and Block :711–716, 2009a) against the very interesting and important, although we believe, erroneous, criticisms of Bagus and Howden :399, 2009).

In this book, William H. F. Altman considers the pedagogical connections behind the post-Republic dialogues from Timaeus to Theaetetus in the context of their Reading Order.

Here, William Bialek provides the first graduate-level introduction to biophysics aimed at physics students.

Neste artigo, pretendo discutir alguns problemas que emergem da associação, já comum na literatura secundária, entre o último dualismo pulsional freudiano, baseado na oposição entre pulsões de vida e de morte, e as teses schopenhauerianas sobre a vida e a morte derivadas de sua metafísica da vontade. A partir de uma confrontação com as leituras de Marcel Zentner e Stephan Atzert, argumentarei a favor da hipótese de que a diferença mais relevante entre os modelos de Freud e de Schopenhauer não (...) diz respeito à distinção no plano ontológico entre dualismo das pulsões e monismo da vontade, mas sim entre sentido biológico e sentido ético da suposta finalidade associada à morte, como “fim” ou “objetivo” da vida. Minha discussão, portanto, gira em torno de uma distinção quanto ao estatuto teleológico que se pode atribuir à dinâmica da relação entre vida e morte nos dois autores. (shrink)

The rapid pace of technological development often outstrips the ability of legislators and regulators to establish proper guardrails on emerging technologies. A solution is for those who develop, deploy, and use these technologies to develop themselves as moral agents—i.e., as agents capable of steering the course of emerging technologies in a direction that will benefit humanity. However, there is a dearth of literature discussing how to foster moral agency in computer science courses, and little if any research on the effectiveness (...) of such courses in computer science. This paper addresses this gap by providing an overview of an undergraduate course on technology ethics. It then shares and discusses a subset of data collected from a mixed-methods study using a pre-post design that sought to examine the course’s effectiveness in developing students’ moral, intellectual, and civic virtues, as well as related dispositions. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a panoply of new forms of ‘social’ government, as manifest in ‘social enterprise’ and ‘social media’. This follows an era of neoliberalism in which social logics were apparently being eliminated, through the expansion of economic rationalities. To understand this, the article explores the critique of the very notion of the ‘social’, as manifest in neoliberal contributions to the socialist calculation debate from the 1920s onwards. Understood as a zone lying between market and state, the (...) social was accused by Mises and Hayek of being both unaccountable (lacking any units of measurement) and formless (lacking instruments of explication). The article then asks to what extent these critiques still retain their purchase, following recent developments in hedonic measurement and data analytics. The argument is made that new post-neoliberal forms of ‘social government’ may now be entirely plausible, though focusing on the corporation rather than the state. (shrink)